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I. Introduction
Taxation is major source of fiscal revenue and has a strong effect on income distribution. Taxation can either reduce inequality or
make inequality worse, depending on the type and rate of taxation. Generally, a personal income tax will improve inequality, whereas
a general sales tax will exacerbate inequality. This is because with the former there is a statutory rate that increases with income, and
with the latter tax is collected from everyone based on consumption rather than on earnings. Therefore, a tax system that relies heavily
on a general sales tax as opposed to a personal income tax has an adverse impact on income distribution. This is precisely the case in
China.
A tax is progressive if tax liability relative to income rises as income increases. Typically, the statutory rate of the personal income
tax increases with income, thus it is progressive. In fact, it is usually the most progressive element in the tax system. Given that the
personal income tax is progressive, the extent to which it contributes to reducing inequality depends on its rate, or the proportion of
the personal income tax to the total income. As will be seen later in this chapter, the contribution of the personal income tax to reduce
inequality mainly depends on two components, its progressivity and the average tax rate. Additional contributions can be derived by
raising the average rate of the personal income tax while holding the progressivity constant, or vice versa. It is clear that the personal
income tax in China is progressive because there is a very high statutory marginal rate.1 The extent of the contribution of the personal
income tax to inequality therefore relies on the average proportion of the tax in the total income.
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In this chapter we use the China Household Income Project (CHIP) urban survey data for 2007 to analyze the impact of the
personal income tax on income distribution in urban China. The CHIP urban dataset contains information on income and taxes at the
individual or household level, so in principle it should not be difficult to gauge the contribution of the personal income tax to income
distribution. Some difficulty arises, however, due to the quality of the information that is reported by the households on the amount of
personal income tax paid by the individual members of the household. On close inspection, we find that the dataset substantially
understates the amount of income taxes paid, probably due to underreporting or/and non-reporting. This bias, if not corrected, will
lead to an underestimation of the contribution of the personal income tax to inequality. Thus, although the main task in this study is to
evaluate the redistributive effect of the personal income tax, a second and necessary task is to address the bias in the reported tax data.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section, Section II, introduces the personal income tax in the context
of the broader Chinese taxation system. In Section III we describe our methodology for measuring the redistributive effect of the
personal income tax; we demonstrate the understatement of the paid taxes in our dataset; and we explain how we address this
understatement by applying the personal income tax schedule to derive the hypothetical tax that a taxpayer would pay based on his
income. This is followed in Section IV by a discussion of estimates of the redistributive effects of the personal income tax. These
estimates are calculated using the hypothetical tax levels that we have imputed, which are equal to the amount of taxes implied by the
official tax schedule. Section V presents our conclusions.

II. The Personal Income Tax in the Chinese Taxation System
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The current Chinese tax system was established as part of the 1994 fiscal reform, which is also called the tax-sharing reform. The most
notable feature of this fiscal reform is the dominance of indirect taxes as a share of the collected tax revenue. Table 10.1 presents the
composition of the tax revenue by major taxes in selected years after the 1994 fiscal reform. The value-added tax (VAT) accounts for
the largest share of the total tax revenue. This share was as high as 44.4 percent in the year after the 1994 fiscal reform but thereafter it
declined; however, in more recent years it still accounted for nearly one-third of total tax revenue. The VAT is levied on the valueadded generated from all activities taking place in primary and secondary industries. Wholesale and retail and repairs and
replacements in the tertiary sector are also subject to the VAT.
The business tax is complementary to the VAT in terms of its sectoral coverage. All activities carried out in tertiary industries,
with the exception of the subsectors subject to the VAT mentioned above and government services, are subject to the business tax.
The business tax is levied on the total sales of tax-paying units and therefore it is a turnover tax. This type of tax is known to have a
cascade effect, which is the main reason for implementation of the VAT. The business tax, as can be seen in Table 10.1, is the third
largest tax in terms of share of tax revenue, accounting for a constant proportion of more than 13 percent of the total tax revenue.
The consumption tax is a type of excise tax charged on selected goods such as tobacco, alcohol, jewelry, motorcycles, motor
vehicles, and so on.2 Customs duties, which consist of value-added and consumption taxes levied on imported goods, as opposed to
goods produced domestically, has provided about 12 percent of the total tax revenue since 2000.
<Table 10.1 about here>
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The above taxes are the four major indirect taxes in China. Together, in 1995 they accounted for about 75 percent of the total
tax revenue. Although this proportion has been declining, in 2007 it still exceeded 60 percent. Excluding customs duties, the three
other major indirect taxes charged on domestic goods and services accounted for more than 68 percent in 1995 and close to 50 percent
(49.3 percent) in 2007 of the total tax revenue.
Clearly, then, since the 1994 fiscal reform Chinese taxation has been mainly dependent on indirect taxes. This feature has
important implications for income distribution. Unlike direct taxes such as a personal income tax, indirect taxes are charged on
expenditures. Because the poor tend to spend a larger proportion of their income than the rich, paid indirect taxes as a proportion of
income tend to decline with household income, a well-known regressive feature of an indirect tax. Fukao et al. (2010) calculate the
traditional tax incidence for China and conclude that, as a whole, the tax system is regressive and has adverse effects on inequality.
This occurs despite the fact that the personal income tax together with the corporate income tax, which are progressive under certain
assumptions, offset some of the adverse redistributive effects of the indirect taxes, but not sufficiently to counter all of their adverse
effects.
As in most countries, China has two types of income tax; one is a corporate income tax and the other is a personal income tax
(PIT). As can be seen in Table 10.1, the corporate income tax shows an upward trend in proportion to total tax revenue, accounting for
close to 20 percent in recent years.3 In the literature on the incidence of taxation, the implications of the corporate income tax on
income distribution remain uncertain, because it is difficult to predict who ultimately bears the costs of corporate taxes. The corporate
tax can be shifted to consumers who buy goods and services produced by enterprises that are subject to the corporate tax. It can also
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be shifted to workers, if the owners of enterprises that are subject to the tax lower wages to reduce their corporate tax liability. After
such shifts in the tax burden, the remaining liability rests with the owners of the enterprises that are subject to the tax. To the extent
that some of the corporate tax is shifted to consumers and/or workers, the corporate tax becomes less progressive than otherwise.
Unlike the taxes discussed above, in general the personal income tax is progressive. Except for limited groups of special-skilled
persons who are able to bargain over their after-tax pay, and for workers who are members of strong labor unions, the personal income
tax is borne by the person subject to the tax. Such is the case in China, where labor unions are not strong. Because the statutory rate
of the personal income tax is typically higher for taxpayers with higher incomes, the average rate of the tax will rise with the income
of the taxpayers. This is the case in China, as will be illustrated below.
The current personal income tax in China is administered on the basis of itemized income. More specifically, income subject to the
PIT is split into different categories, each of which has a different exemption, deduction, tax rate, and so on. The personal tax liability
is the sum of the taxes paid in the different categories of taxable income. Table 10A.1 in the Appendix to this chapter summarizes the
main elements in the personal income tax in 2007.

III. Methodology and Data Issues
The purpose of this study is to measure how and to what extent the personal income tax affects inequality in urban China. The most
frequently used measure of the redistributive effects of taxes is an index proposed by Musgrave and Thin (1948), called the MT index.
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The MT index is defined as the difference between the Gini coefficients of before-tax and after-tax income, which is expressed by the
following formula:

MT = G − G *

(1)

where MT stands for the MT index. G and G * represent the Gini coefficients for before- and after-tax income, respectively. If the
tax helps to reduce inequality, then after-tax inequality as measured by the after-tax Gini coefficient should be lower than before-tax
inequality, and the MT index should have a positive value. Conversely, if the tax has dis-equalizing effects, then the MT index will
take a negative value. The sign and size of the MT index is used as an indicator of how and to what degree taxes influence the income
distribution.
The progressivity of a tax is another important indicator used to assess redistributive effects. A tax is proportional if its rate
remains constant with income, and it is progressive (regressive) if the rate goes up (or down) with income. The most common measure
of progressivity, called a P index, was proposed by Kakwani (1977). A P index is defined as the concentration ratio of the tax minus
the Gini coefficient of before-tax income. That is:
P = C −G

(2)

where P denotes the P index of the tax and C denotes the concentration ratio of the tax. The concentration ratio of a tax is an
indicator of the distribution of the tax liability among the population in association with income.4 If the concentration of a tax equals
the Gini coefficient of the before-tax income (that is, the P index takes a value of 0), it means that the tax has the same distribution
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among the population as that of income in the sense that the proportion of tax liability to income is constant for any individual in the
population, or that each individual’s share of the total tax liability equals that individual’s share of the total income. This implies that
the tax is proportional. If the concentration ratio of the tax is larger than the Gini coefficient of before-tax income (that is, the P index
takes a positive value), then the tax share is higher than the income share for individuals with higher incomes and lower for
individuals with lower incomes.5 Thus, it is a progressive tax. A regressive tax can be defined similarly.
Kakwani (1984) makes a distinction between the measure of the redistributive effects of the tax and the measure of the
progressivity of the tax by decomposing the MT index into two components as follows:

MT = (Cd − G * ) +

tP
1− t

(3)

where C d stands for the concentration ratio of after-tax income,6 and t is the average rate of the tax. An explanation of the two terms
on the right-hand side of equation (3) is linked to the principle of two types of tax equity: horizontal equity and vertical equity. In fact,
the two terms measure the effects of the two types of tax equity on income distribution. The principle of horizontal tax equity requires
that equals should be treated equally. The equals are defined in terms of ability to pay (the tax); observed income is commonly used as
a measurable indicator of the ability to pay. In other words, the principle of horizontal tax equity requires that individuals with
identical incomes should pay the same amount of tax. Whether, and to what extent, the principle of horizontal tax equity is violated is
examined empirically by comparing the rankings of individuals in a post-tax distribution of income to their rankings in a pre-tax
distribution of income. Rosen (1978), following a suggestion by Feldstein (1976), uses the rank correlation coefficients between the
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pre- and post-tax ordering of the estimated utilities to measure departures from horizontal equity. The measure, as pointed out by
Kakwani (1984), has no clear link to any indicator of inequality, thus the effect of horizontal inequity on the distribution of income
cannot be measured. Atkinson (1980) employs the concentration ratio and Gini coefficient of after-tax income to examine the effect on
equality of a change in the ranking of an individual by taxation, but does not propose any summary indicator. Plotnick (1981) uses a
similar measure as the first term on the left-hand side of equation (3) above to measure the horizontal inequity, but he does not link the
measure to indices of inequality.
Horizontal equity, examined by a re-ranking of individuals based on after-tax income, requires that the after-tax income should
not change the before-tax ranking of individuals. If horizontal equity is violated, the redistributive effects of taxation on inequality are
affected. In other words, given the progressivity of the taxation, a reduction in the Gini coefficient of after-tax income would be
moderate if there were a change in the pre- and post-tax income rankings of individuals. The first term on the right-hand side of
equation (3) captures this point. Where C d is the concentration ratio of the after-tax income, with the ranking by the before-tax
income, G * is the Gini coefficient of the after-tax income, with the ranking of the after-tax income. C d equals G * if the rankings of
the pre-tax and post-tax income are identical. Otherwise, as demonstrated Kakwani (1980), Atkinson (1980), and Plotnick (1981), the
former is smaller than the latter. This means that C d − G * , the first term on the right-hand side of the equation, takes a maximum value
of 0 when the tax does not change the ranking of individuals, and takes a negative value whenever there is a change in ranking from
the pre-tax to the post-tax income. It is clear that, given the progressivity of the taxation (the second term on the right-hand side of
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equation [3]), the redistributive effect of taxation on inequality is reduced (the MT index will take a small value) when there is a
change in the ranking from the pre-tax and post-tax income (that is, C d − G * takes negative values).
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) measures the contribution of the progressivity of the tax to inequality.
This term is related to the principle of vertical tax equity, which means that people with different incomes are taxed differently. P is a
widely used indicator proposed by Kakwani to measure the tax progressivity. As discussed above, P takes a value of 0 if the tax rate is
constant among people with different incomes; it takes a negative value if the tax rate decreases with income, and it takes a positive
value if the tax rate increases with income. A progressive tax, that is, a tax whose rate increases with income, will contribute to a
reduction in inequality, but inequality will remain unchanged if the tax is proportional, and inequality may become worse if the tax is
regressive. Note that, with C d − G * given, the extent to which the tax contributes to inequality depends on not only how progressive the
tax is (captured by P in the second term on the right-hand side of equation [3]), but also on how high the tax rate is, which is
measured by t /(1 + t ) in the term. It is clear that given the progressivity of the tax, a higher tax rate will result in a higher contribution
of tax to inequality.
Like other chapters in this book, the data used in this study come from the 2007 CHIP. We limit our analysis to the CHIP
urban sample because the current PIT in China is limited to residents in urban areas. The migrant sample is not included in this study
due to data availability.7 Thus, our sample of 10,000 households only includes urban residents.
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In addition to information on the total income of individuals and the major components of their income, the CHIP urban
dataset also contains information on taxes paid by individuals. Whereas the personal income tax is administered on the basis of
itemized income, which means taxpayers pay their income tax by the category of the income they earn, taxes in the dataset are not
listed separately according to the income components. Only the aggregate amount of the income tax is provided. On inspection, based
on two checks of the data we find that the available information on taxes in the dataset understates the taxes paid by individuals. First,
we compare the average PIT rate found in our dataset with that derived from tax data published by the State Administration of
Taxation (SAT), the government agency responsible for collecting the PIT and other taxes, which publishes annual total tax revenue
and revenue by tax, including revenue from the PIT. Information on the total PIT collected each year published by the SAT can be
considered to be accurate.8 We combine this tax information with the total gross income of urban households published by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) based on the NBS household survey,9 to provide an estimate of the average rate of the PIT for
urban households as a whole. The resulting tax rates, as shown in Table 10.2, are 2.95 percent in 2002 and 3.60 percent in 2007. If the
available information on taxes in the CHIP urban dataset is accurate and free of underreporting or non-reporting, it should yield an
average PIT rate close to the average rate obtained above, on the assumption that our urban sample is representative of all urban
households in terms of income. The average rate of the PIT based on our dataset, however, is much lower than that calculated from the
SAT and NBS data: 0.33 percent in 2002 and 0.85 percent in 2007,10 far below the rates reported in Table 10.2.
<Table 10.2 about here>
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Our second check is to look at the information on income and taxes in our dataset to see whether or not all individuals with
positive taxable income report taxes.11 We limit this check to the two major income components subject to the PIT. One is wages and
salary, and the other is business operating income. Under the current Chinese personal income tax law, any person who earned wages
and salary of more than 800 yuan in any month of 2002 (1,600 yuan in 2007), which were the allowable deductions in those two years,
must pay an income tax. Of 5,137 individuals whose average monthly income was above 800 yuan in 2002, 64.6 percent, or 3,319
individuals, reported no tax. This is a fairly large portion. The non-reporting of tax might be more likely for individuals with low
wages than for individuals with high wages, probably due to the fact that the small amount of tax owed by the former is easier to
overlook than the large amount owed by the latter. In order to determine whether this is the case, we look at the proportion of
individuals failing to report any tax by quintiles of taxable wages. The results are summarized in Table 10.3 for 2002 and 2007. The
table confirms our point. In 2002, the proportion of individuals with positive taxable income who did not report paying taxes dropped
significantly by quintile of the income distribution, from 84.7 percent in the lowest quintile to 46.2 percent in the highest quintile.
The picture does not change for 2007, with the exception that the proportion of individuals reporting no tax decreased both for the
entire sample and for each quintile, reflecting an improvement in the administration of the personal income tax.
<Table 10.3 about here>
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The non-reporting of tax also occurs among individuals who earn business operating income. Under the personal income tax
law, any person must pay the PIT on her/his positive net operational income. Table 10.4 presents information on the non-reporting of
tax by quintile of net operating business income. As can be seen in the table, 715 individuals in our dataset in 2002 earned a positive
net operating income, of which only 5.0 percent reported a positive tax for this category of income. In 2007, the proportion was higher
at 9.39 percent, another sign of an improvement in the administration of taxation. The portion reporting no tax among earners of
business operating income is much lower than that of wage earners. The proportion of individuals who report no tax on net operating
income is lower in the lower and higher quintiles and higher in the middle quintiles in both 2002 and 2007.
<Table 10.4 about here>
In view of the very large discrepancy between average tax rates implied by the SAT and NBS data and that found in the CHIP
urban datasets, and also in view of the high incidence of no reported tax payments in the CHIP urban datasets, we conclude that the
tax information in our data is understated and inadequate for an assessment of the redistributive effects of the PIT. The assessment can
be affected by the inadequacy of information in many ways. First, the reported data from our household survey underestimate the
amount of paid personal income tax and thus underestimate the redistributive effects of the tax on inequality, all else being equal,
because the degree of the distributional impact of taxes on inequality depends on the tax rate, as shown in equation (3). Second, there
is a tendency that a higher proportion of individuals with lower taxable income do not report their taxes and this will overestimate the
progressivity of the tax, thus over-evaluating the impact of the personal income tax on inequality. Finally, the inaccurate data in our
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household survey could give a different ordering of individuals on the basis of the after-tax income, thus leading to erroneous
estimates of the effects of horizontal equity, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3).
The understatement of taxation in our dataset must be corrected in order to obtain a reliable assessment of the redistributive
effects of the PIT in China. One way to deal with the inaccurate data is to apply the personal income tax schedule to impute the
theoretical amount of tax liability, on the assumption that taxpayers paid all the taxes for which they were liable according to the
composition of their income. Even though the imputed tax is unlikely to be identical to the taxes actually paid by each taxpayer, we
believe that this is still better than the reported tax information in our dataset and can be used to evaluate the impact of the PIT on
income distribution. The use of the imputed tax to evaluate the redistributive effect of taxes has the advantage that it provides
estimates of the distributional impact of the PIT when it is fully implemented.
The personal income tax in China is currently implemented on an itemized basis. That is, the total income of individuals is
subdivided into many components, to each of which different deductions and tax rates apply. In order to derive the tax liability from
the available information on income in our dataset, the income information in our dataset must be consistent with the Personal Income
Tax Law (PITL) in several respects, such as the subdivisions of the total income, the definitions of each income component, and the
time period for which each income component is measured. We discuss below whether or not these requirements are met.
Regarding the subdivision of the total income and the definitions of its components, fortunately the components of the total
income available from our household data are broadly consistent with the income categories in the PITL. Wages and salary, based on
the PITL, had a monthly allowable deduction of 800 yuan in 2002 and 1,600 yuan in 2007, and taxable income, derived from the
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monthly total of wages and salary minus the monthly deduction, is subdivided into nine income ranges. Increasing tax rates are
applied to the nine income ranges, with the lowest at 5 percent and the highest at 45 percent. The wage and salary component of
income is available in our data as a distinct component of the total income, which can be used to calculate the tax liability for this
category of income. Other labor income is further divided into two parts in the PITL. One is the so-called individual service income,
including income from a wide range of activities, such as designing, drafting, testing, medical practices, lecturing, and so on,12 and the
other is remuneration from manuscripts. In our dataset, however, the two parts are combined into one category. This does not matter,
however, because the two parts have the same deduction, 20 percent of the amount received (for amounts of 4,000 yuan and more) or
800 yuan (for amounts of less than 4,000 yuan), and also the same tax rate is applied to each of them (20 percent of taxable income).13
Production and business income in the PITL broadly corresponds to the operational income from business in our dataset. Both
define income as net income, that is, gross income less the costs spent for making the gross income. The category of income in the
PITL called income from contracted or leased operations of enterprises/institutions does not correspond to the information in our
dataset and thus is ignored in our calculations. Property income is divided into four categories in the PITL: (1) royalties, (2) interest,
dividends, or bonuses, (3) rental income from leasing, and (4) income from the sale of property. Each of these four categories are
available separately in our dataset. The definitions of property income in the PITL and in the dataset show that the coverage of each
category of property income is broadly consistent.
Although the division of total income and the definition of each component of total income in our dataset are consistent with
the PITL, the time-period for which the income is reported in our dataset differs from the time-period for which the taxable income is
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measured and taxed for all components of income, except for the operating income (production and business income in the PITL).
This presents a substantial obstacle in calculating the tax liability using our household survey data.
The PIT on wages and salary is charged on a monthly basis, whereas income in our dataset is annual income. In calculating the
tax on wages and salary, we use the average monthly income from wages and salary, derived from the annual income divided by 12
(months), to estimate the amount of tax paid monthly. The monthly amount of tax times 12 (months) is used as the annual total of paid
tax for this income component. The use of the average monthly wages and salary will underestimate the tax liability for this
component of income, as it tends to overestimate the (monthly) allowable deduction and reduce the portion of income applicable to a
higher marginal tax rate for this component of income. This is always the case whenever individual income varies across months in a
year. The following example is illustrative.. Assume a person earns 6,000 yuan in wages in two months, 1,000 yuan in the first month
and 5,000 yuan in the second month. The total individual tax liability according to the PITL is 360 yuan. The tax distribution between
the two months is 0 in the first month and 360 yuan in the second month. However, the estimated tax liability based on the average
monthly income will be 130 yuan, i.e., 65 yuan for each month. The imputed tax liability is much lower than the true tax liability. This
is the case whenever an individual’s wages vary across months.
For the other components of labor income (inclusive of the personal service income and the income from manuscripts), all the
components of the property income (inclusive of royalties, interest and dividends, rental income from the leasing of property, and
income from the sale of property), and contingency income and other income in the PITL, according to the PITL taxes are imposed on
each single receipt, whereas only the annual totals of these income components are available in our dataset.14 In order to calculate tax
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liability on these income components we need to determine the number of times that individuals receive payments of each of these
income components. The number of receipts for a given annual total of these income components will affect the deductions for these
income components, but will not affect the tax rates applied to the income components, except for personal service income of more
than 20,000 yuan in one receipt, because a uniform tax rate of 20 percent is applied to all these income components (see the Appendix
to this chapter). Given the annual total of each of these income components, an increase in the number of receipts will increase the
total amount of deductions, thus reducing the amount of paid taxes. This indicates that the current PITL provides taxpayers with an
incentive to increase the number of times, whenever possible, that they receive a given amount of income. By doing this, their tax
burdens can be reduced.
How do we determine the number of times individuals receive the given annual total of each of these income components in
our dataset? Since housing rents dominate property leasing by households and payments of housing rent are normally made monthly,
it is reasonable to assume twelve receipts per year for rental income from property leasing. With respect to interest from savings,
based on current banking practice in China, interest payments are made quarterly for demand deposits, but only after the contracted
period for fixed deposits. Dividend payments, if any (many corporations do not pay dividends for years), are normally made once per
year, and there are very few cases where dividend payments are made twice per year. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
individuals only receive interest and dividends once per year if they receive any of this type of income.
For the remainder of the income components for which taxes are charged on the basis of receipts, we assume twelve times if
the individuals receive any amount of each of these income components. The reason for twelve times per year (or once a month),
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rather than once a year, is that monthly is the commonly used time-span in accounting of economic activities, and the PITL provides
an incentive, whenever possible, for individuals to make monthly rather than annual payments. Given the annual totals of each of
these income components, the number of receipts differs among individuals. We ignore the differences due to a lack of relevant
information. Below, in order to test the sensitivity of the estimates of the redistributive effects to the number of receipts, we provide
alternative estimates based on the assumption of payments once per year, instead of twelve times per year, for all income components
that are charged on a per receipt basis. This excludes two income components, that is, rental income from the leasing of property and
interest and dividends, for which we assume twelve times per year for the former and once per year for the latter.
The operational business income available in our data is broadly in line with the production and business income subject to a
personal income tax in the PITL, on the basis of both the time and definition of the income component. The annual income of the
former is reported in our data, which is consistent with the time-span for which this income component is measured and taxed in the
PITL. The operational income reported in our data is net income, that is, gross income minus costs incurred in the process of
generating the gross income. Similarly, taxable production and business income is calculated as the total income minus the deductions
for the cost of production and sales, which actually is net income. Because the two measures are consistent, the imputed tax reliability
of this category of income should be more accurate than that of the other categories of income that are liable to taxes.

IV. Estimation of the Redistributive Effects of the Personal Income Tax on Income Distribution
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In this section, we examine the redistributive effects of the personal income tax using the imputed tax estimates derived in the last
section.15 Because our purpose is to assess the impact of the personal income tax on the income distribution of the entire population,
our analysis below covers all family members rather than only those family members who are working and paying an individual
income tax.
Before presenting the MT index and its decomposition, we provide the average tax rate across deciles of per capita before-tax
income in Table 10.5. With very few exceptions, the average tax rate increases as we move up the income distribution in both years
under review, indicating a progressive individual income tax. This is not surprising since the statutory rate increases with income
earned for most income components in the PITL. The average tax rate for the highest deciles was above seven times that for the lowest
deciles in 2002. This ratio increased to 51.6 in 2007, suggesting an increase in the progressivity of the PIT between the two years.
It is worth noting that the average tax rate does not move up in a straight line along the deciles. It was slightly lower for the third
decile than it was for the second decile in 2002, but it was much lower for the second decile than for the lowest decile. This is mainly
due to the fact that the tax burden differs based on the income source, and the composition of the income source varies across deciles.
In 2007, for instance, operating income constituted 10.5 percent of the total income for the lowest decile, but 7.1 percent for the
second-lowest decile.16 The same figures for property income are 0.41 percent and 0.31 percent respectively. However, the tax burden
is much higher for property income and operating income than it is for other income sources, for instance, wages and salary. Defining
the tax burden of a certain income component as the proportion of the tax charged on that income component of the total tax, on
average the tax burden in 2007 was 21.3 percent for property income, 18.5 percent for operating income, and 3.4 percent for wages
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and salary. Therefore, the reason why the average rate of the total tax for the lowest decile exceeded that for the second-lowest decile
in 2007 is because for the lowest decile income components with high tax burdens constituted a larger proportion of total income.

<Table 10.5 about here>

We now report the estimates of the MT index and the P index. The relevant figures are summarized in Table 10.6. Most of the
results in this table are expected, given the pattern of the average tax rate across deciles in Table 10.5. The Gini coefficient decreases
after taxes in both years and the MT index takes a positive sign, meaning that the tax is equalizing. A rise in the MT index during the
period under examination, from 0.0064 in 2002 to 0.0137 in 2007, indicates an increasing redistributive effect of the individual
income tax on the inequality of urban households. The P index takes positive sign in both years, implying that the tax is progressive.
This is not surprising given the rise in the average tax rate as we move up the income distribution. The increase in the P index between
the two years, from 0.31 in 2002 to 0.33 in 2007, implies that the individual income tax in China became more progressive over this
period.
The unexpected message, perhaps the most important message, conveyed by Table 10.6 is that the equalizing effects of the
individual income tax on inequality are so small that the after- tax income inequality shows little improvement compared with that of
the before-tax income. It is clear from the MT index that the tax reduced the Gini coefficient of before-tax income by only 0.64
percentage points in 2002 and by only 1.37 percentage points in 2007.
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<Table 10.6 about here>
A decomposition of the MT index into the effects of horizontal equity and vertical equity provides some clues as to why the
personal income tax makes only a minor contribution to inequality. The results of the decomposition are presented in Table 10.7. As
shown, the measure of the horizontal equity is -0.0002 for both 2002 and 2007, meaning that the current personal income tax altered
the ordering of individuals based on the before-tax income and violated the principle of horizontal equity, but not to a great extent.
The violation of the principle of horizontal equity was mainly due to the different tax burdens of the different sources of income, as
discussed above.
<Table 10.7 about here>
Given the negative but small values of the measures of horizontal equity, the MT index is very close to a measure of vertical
equity. In other words, the degree of the redistributive effect of the personal income tax in China mainly depends on the degree of
vertical equity. The effect of vertical equity, as shown in the last section, consists of two parts: the progressivity of the tax, measured
by the P index, and the average tax rate. With the P index given in Table 10.6 and the average tax rate given in Table 10.5, the effect
of vertical equity, as shown in Table 10.7, was 0.0066 in 2002 and 0.0139 in 2007. Although raising the progressivity of the tax may
increase the redistributive effects of the tax, the small impacts of the current personal income tax on inequality were mainly due to the
low tax rate.
This point becomes more evident from international comparison. Wagstaff et al. (1999) evaluated the redistributive effects of the
personal income tax for twelve OECD countries on a comparable basis, using a similar methodology to that used in our study.17
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According to their estimates, the concentration ratio of the personal income tax among the twelve OECD countries takes a minimum
value of 0.3895, and a maximum value of 0.6628, with a simple mean of 0.5251. These figures are significantly lower than those in
China, where the concentration ratio is 0.7574 in 2007 (Table 10.6). The P index, defined above as the concentration ratio of taxes
minus the Gini coefficient of before-tax income, shows a similar pattern. For the twelve OECD countries it takes a minimum value of
0.0891, a maximum value of 0.2717, and a simple average of 0.1963, but in China in 2007 the P index has very high value of 0.4115.
A comparison of the tax rates, however, shows the opposite pattern. The effective tax rate is very high in the OECD countries, with a
minimum of 6.2 percent, a maximum of 32.7 percent, and a simple mean of 16.61 percent, but it is very low in China, at 3.27 percent
in 2007. Although a comparison between China and other developing countries is difficult due to lack of data, there is still some
scattered evidence available for this purpose. Bird and Zolt (2005), for instance, provide information on two ratios: the ratio of
revenues from the personal income tax to GDP and the ratio of revenues from the personal income tax to fiscal revenues of the central
government. These two ratios in 2005 are, respectively, 0.3 percent and 1.7 percent for China, 0.4 percent and 2.6 percent for
Vietnam, 1.4 percent and 16.1 percent for India, 2.1 percent and 17.2 percent for the Philippines, and 2.7 percent and 14.7 percent for
Malaysia. Thus China’s personal income tax is relatively low compared to that in other Asian countries (the ratios for Korea and
Japan are even higher).
One last task is a sensitivity analysis. In calculating the tax liability based on the individual income tax schedule above, we know
that assumptions of how many times an individual receives payments of certain income components can affect the tax liability for
every individual who has income from such sources. Estimations of the redistributive effects of these taxes are based on the
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assumption that each of the income components was received once per month. In order to look at the sensitivity of the estimated
redistributive effects of the tax to this assumption, we assume that individuals who have these income sources receive each of these
income components once per year, with the exception of two of these income sources, that is, income from property rentals and
income from interest and dividends.18
The results of these re-estimations show that the once per year assumption increases the average tax rate, but reduces the
progressivity of the tax.19 The MT index eventually became smaller, from 0.0064 to 0.0061 in 2002, and from 0.0137 to 0.0133 in
2007. The changes in the estimated MT index can be considered small, suggesting that the assumption regarding the number of times
an individual receives an income component for which there are taxes does not greatly change the redistributive effects.

V. Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the redistributive effects of the individual income tax. Due to the substantial understatement
of the PIT in the CHIP urban dataset, we apply the official tax schedule to the reported components of income to impute the tax
liability for individuals in our sample. Using this imputed tax liability, which measures the taxes individuals would pay if their taxes
were paid according to the regulations, we calculate the MT index, the most commonly used measure of the redistributive effects of
taxes and governmental subsidies, and we decompose the MT index into the effects of horizontal equity and vertical equity. The MT
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index and its decomposition reveal that the personal income tax does reduce inequality, but the effect is negligible. The low average
personal income tax rate is the main reason why the personal income tax fails to contribute more to improving inequality.
We note that our results are based on the assumption that individuals pay taxes according to the official income tax rates. In
fact, actual tax payments are probably lower than those implied by the regulations. Also, the discrepancy between actual tax payments
and the amounts owed according to the regulations is probably greater among higher-income individuals than among lower-income
individuals. For these reasons, the redistributive impact of the personal income tax may be even weaker than what is implied by our
estimates.
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Appendix
Table 10A.1. Main elements of the personal income tax in China: Categories of income subject to the personal income tax by
category, the time basis for the tax levied, deductions, and the tax schedule
Category of taxable income

Basis on
which the
tax is levied

Deduction

Wage and salary income

Monthly

RMB 1 600

Production and business income

Annual

Costs

Income from contracted or leased
operations
of
enterprises/institutions

Annual

RMB 1 600*12
months
20% of receipts or
RMB 800*
20% of receipts or
RMB 800*
20% of receipts or
RMB 800*

Tax rate
0 - 500: 1%; 501- 2 000: 10%;
2 001 - 5 000 15%; 5 001 - 20 000: 20%; 20 001 - 40
000: 25%; 40 001 - 60 000: 30%; 60 001 - 80 000: 35%;
80 001 - 100 000: 40%; 100 001 -: 45%
0 - 5 000: 5%; 5 001 - 10 000: 10%; 10 001 - 30 000:
20%; 30 001 - 50 000: 30%; 50 001 -: 35%
0 - 5 000: 5%; 5 001 - 10 000: 10%; 10 001 - 30 000:
20%; 30 001 - 50 000: 30%; 50 001 -: 35%

Income from individual services

Per receipt

Remuneration from manuscripts

Per receipt

Royalties

Per receipt

Interest and dividends

Per receipt

No deductions

20%

Per receipt

20% of receipts or
RMB 800*; taxes,

20%

Rental income
leasing

from

property
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0 - 20 000: 20%; 20 001 - 50 000: 30%; 50 001 -: 40%
20%
20%

Income from sale of properties

Per receipt

Contingency income
Other income that the MOF
specifies as taxable
Note: * Whichever is higher.

Per receipt

levies, and repair
costs incurred
Original value of
the property;
reasonable
expenses
No deductions

20%

No deductions

20%
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20%

Table 10.1. Share of major taxes in total tax revenue in
selected years after the 1994 fiscal reform
Tax
1995
2000
2005
2007
VAT (Value-Added
44.4
36.9
34.7
31.6
Tax)
Consumption Tax
9.3
6.8
5.3
4.5
Customs Duty
6.6
11.8
13.7
12.4
Business Tax
14.6
14.9
13.7
13.3
Corporate Income Tax
13.8
14.0
17.9
19.6
Personal Income Tax
2.2
5.2
6.8
6.4
Other Taxes
9.1
10.4
8.0
12.2
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
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Table 10.2. Comparison of household data average tax rates and alternative data average tax rates
Data source

Year

2002

2007

Household data

0.33

0.85

Alternative data

2.95

3.60
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Table 10.3. Mean income and proportion of individuals (non-) reporting the personal income tax
Quintile*

Mean taxable
income
(yuan/monthly)*

Number of
observations
(persons)

Proportion reporting tax (%)
No

Yes

Total

(2002)
1
70
1029
84.7
15.3
100
2
215
1026
75.0
25.0
100
3
389
1028
63.3
36.7
100
4
657
1028
54.0
46.0
100
5
1,551
1026
46.2
53.8
100
Total
576
5137
64.6
35.4
100
(2007)
1
143
1,345
79.3
20.7
100
2
461
1,325
67.7
32.3
100
3
894
1,334
49.6
50.4
100
4
1,623
1,335
37.6
62.4
100
5
3,938
1,334
28.0
72.0
100
Total
1,411
6,673
52.5
47.5
100
Note: * The mean taxable income is the gross monthly income minus the allowable deduction of 800 yuan in 2002 and
1,600 yuan in 2007. The quintiles are obtained based on the gross monthly income. The gross monthly income for each
individual is derived from the annual income in our dataset divided by 12 (months). Ideally, the monthly gross income
actually earned by individuals in a certain month should be used. This is impossible, however, because in our dataset we
only have information on the annual wage and salary. But the mean monthly income still meets our requirements. This
is because if the mean monthly income of an individual exceeds 1,600 yuan, then during at least one month in the year
under review this individual must have earned more than 1,600 yuan, and this individual should report and pay the PIT.
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Table 10.4. Mean business operating income and the proportion of individuals
(non-) reporting the personal income tax
Quintil
e
(2002)
1
2
3
4
5
Total
(2007)
1
2
3
4
5
Total

Mean taxable
income
(yuan/annual)

Number of
observations
(persons)

1,153
3,548
5,691
8,902
19,539
7,760
154
486
1,046
2,089
7,069
2,156

Proportion of whether reporting tax
(%)
No

Yes

Total

145
141
143
143
143
715

95.9
100.0
96.5
93.7
88.8
95.0

4.1
0.0
3.5
6.3
11.2
5.0

100
100
100
100
100
100

119
111
121
109
115
575

94.12
93.69
89.26
91.74
84.35
90.61

5.88
6.31
10.74
8.26
15.65
9.39

100
100
100
100
100
100
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Table 10.5. Average personal income tax rate by decile
Tax rate
Relative tax rate
(%)
(lowest deciles=1)
Decile
2002
2007
2002
2007
1
0.60
0.15
1.00
1.00
2
0.71
0.18
1.18
1.22
3
0.70
0.35
1.16
2.33
4
0.77
0.52
1.29
3.45
5
0.86
0.76
1.43
5.05
6
1.21
1.16
2.02
7.71
7
1.40
1.65
2.34
10.98
8
1.53
2.40
2.56
15.98
9
2.34
3.48
3.91
23.23
10
4.25
7.74
7.10
51.62
All
deciles
2.06
3.27
3.44
21.79
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Table 10.6. The MT index and the P index
2002
Gini coefficient of pre-tax income ( G )
0.3212
*
0.3148
Gini coefficient of post-tax income ( G )
MT index ( MT )
0.0064
Concentration ratio of tax ( C )
0.6330
Kakwani index ( P )
0.3117
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2007
0.3459
0.3322
0.0137
0.7574
0.4115

Table 10.7. Decomposition of the MT index
into the effects of horizontal equity and vertical equity
2002
2007
MT index ( MT )
0.0064
0.0137
*
Horizontal equity ( C d − G )
-0.0002
-0.0002
Vertical equity (=p*t/(1-t))

0.0066
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0.0139

*The authors are grateful to Terry Sicular for comments. All remaining errors are ours.
1

The personal income tax is administered on the basis of the itemized components of the total taxable income. Income from other
sources has different exemptions, deductions, tax rates, and so on.
2

For a complete list of goods subject to the consumption tax, see China Master Tax Guide (2007).

3

The corporate tax as a share of total tax revenue is based on the total revenue of the corporate tax paid by both domestic enterprises
and FDI enterprises. Before 2007, the year under study, the corporate tax differed for domestic enterprises and for FDI enterprises,
with preferential treatment for the latter. However, the two taxes have been integrated since 2008.
4

A rigorous definition of the tax concentration ratio requires a concentration curve of the tax. The concentration curve is a curve with
the accumulated share of the population sorted by income in ascending order measured on the horizontal axis, and the share of tax
liability of the corresponding population measured on the vertical axis. The concentration curve is exactly the same as the Lorenz
income curve, except that in the former the population is sorted by income, not by tax. The concentration ratio is computed on exactly
the same basis on the concentration curve as the Gini coefficient is computed on the Lorenz curve.
5

In a diagram of the Lorenz curve, the concentration curve lies farther away than the Lorenz curve from the diagonal, and therefore
the area between the diagonal and the concentration curve is larger than the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve; in this
case, the P index is positive.
6

Note that the concentration ratio of after-tax income is derived from the concentration curve of after-tax income, and the
concentration curve of after-tax income is plotted with the income units sorted according to before-tax income, not after-tax income.
7

According to law, migrant workers in cities also have to pay personal income tax; however, income data from the migrant sample of
the 2007 CHIP are given for the family as a whole, not for each of the family members. This presents an obstacle to estimations of the
tax liabilities for wages and salaries, which are levied on an individual basis. For this reason, we do not incorporate migrants from the
CHIP migrant survey in our analysis.
8

It is worth noting that the accuracy of the tax data published by the SAT differs from tax evasion. It is widely believed that there is
huge PIT evasion in China. This tax evasion, however, is irrelevant to the accuracy of the information on tax revenue actually
collected and published by the tax authorities.
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9

The total gross income of urban households is derived from the gross urban income per capita times the total urban population.

10

The average rate of the PIT is derived from the ratio of the total tax to the total gross household income (times 100). It is actually
the weighted average of the PIT rate of each individual, with the income of each individual as the weight.

11

One might argue that zero tax for a taxpayer with a positive taxable income could be due to tax evasion rather than non-reporting as
we claim here. If this were the case, the average tax rate derived from our dataset would be close to that based on the macro data.
However, this is not the case.
12

For the difference between wages and salary and individual service income, see CCH (2007: 83).

13

Refer to the Appendix to this chapter for details.

14

The tax on income from contracted or leased operations of enterprises/institutions is charged on an annual basis, with a monthly
deduction of 800 yuan in 2002 and 1,600 yuan in 2007. As noted in the text, this component is ignored in our calculations because it
does not have a separate income component in our dataset.
15

We also compare the estimated distributive effects between the imputed tax and the reported tax to determine how the reported tax
information will bias the estimates of the progressivity and redistributive effects of the personal income tax.
16

Here the total income includes transfer income, which is exempt from tax.

17

The year under investigation in Wagstaff et al. (1999) varies by country, ranging from 1987 to 1993.

18

We assume once per month for the former and once per year for the latter.

19

The once per year assumption reduces the deductions, thus increases the tax liability, compared with the once per month assumption.
This, combined with the fact that the income components on which the taxes are levied on a per receipt basis constitute a larger
proportion of the total income for low-income households than for high-income households, reduces the progressivity of the tax.
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